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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRED 0. WOLD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-v~.-

OGDEN CITY, a :Municipal Corporation, and WHEELWRIGHT CONSTRUCTION CO~IP ANY OF
OGDEN, UTAH,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 7927

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action with prejudice made upon motion
of respondents at the close of appellant's opening statement.
Appellant's case came on for trial on the 2nd day of
October, 1952, and after the opening statement, motions
were made by both respondents for dismissal. From
the pleadings and the ·opening statement it appears that
the following are the facts upon which the order of the
court was entered.
On June 26, 1951, at 12:30 o'clock A.M., appellant
drove his automobile eastward along 18th Street in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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City of Ogden; that at a point just east of where Kiesel
A venue enters 18th Street plaintiff stopped, parked the
automobile and attempted to cross from a point where
Kiesel Avenue enters 18th Street to his home located at
336 18th Stre·et. Appellant was accompanied by his wife.
During lthe day of the 25th of June respondent,
Wheelwright Construction Company, had dug a trench
in an easterly-westerly direction, which was 4¥2 feet
deep and betwe·en 2 and 2¥2 feet wide. The trench extended from Grant Avenue to Washington Avenue, and
was along the northern edge of 18th Street. The dirt,
which was removed from the trench, had been piled on
the south side of it. The trench was being dug by the
construction company on behalf of the respondent, Ogden
City, and with the permission of Ogden City. Exhibit
"A" accurately reflects the condition of the trench as it
was at the time appellant was injured, with the exception
of the covering appearing in the foreground of the picture. No covering was in place on the morning of .Tune
26th. The trench had been dug while appellant was at
work during the day of June 25th Appellant had had
no opportunity to examine it in the daylight prior to
his injury.
There were no lights along the trench, either street
lights or Ian terns ; there were no openings constructed
through the bank of dirt, and no bridges or other coverings over the trench for persons to use in crossing from
the street onto the sidewalk.
On the day of the 25th of June l\ir. 1\filler, in whose
home appellant resided, had requested the Wheelwright
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Construction Cmnpany, as they were constructing the
trench, to provide a n1eans for crossing over the trench
and bank of dirt at a point where his driveway intersected 18th Street. This was not done. A flat refusal
was accorded ~Ir. Miller's request.
The picture, Exhibit ''A," shows the bridge constructed by ~Ir. :fililler at a later time over the trench
and is at a point where his driveway intersects 18th
Street. The driveway is also directly acros~ from the
point where the sidewalk at Kiesel A venue intersect:J
18th Street.
During the opening statement of counsel a rough
sketch was used and a picture of the sketch is attached
and made a part of the record, being a blue page with a
photograph attached to it. That photograph shows Kiesel
Avenue and is the area marked with an "S," which indicates a southerly direction.
At no place along 18th Street had there been provided any way for pedestrians to cross over the bank of
dirt or the trench. The trees along 18th Street, in the
vicinity of 336, are large· and provide a dense shade on
the sidewalk (See Exhibit "A").
On lthe morn_ing of the 26th appellant, having stopped
his automobile immediately to the east of the point where
Kiesel A venue intersects 18th Street, walked across 18th
Street and inspected the trench and the bank of dirt,
climbed over the bank of dirt and decided that he could
safely cross the trench and enter his home at 336 18th
Street. To do this he placed one foot on the southern
edge of the trench and the other across on the northe-rn
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edge of the trench. It was his intention to stand in that
position and assist his wife across the trench. Appellant
was straddling the trench facing east. While in that position the south bank of the trench collapsed under his foot
and he fell into the trench, striking the left side of his
body against the bank of the trench. The fall fractured
two of his ribs which necessitated loss of approximately
ten weeks f_rom his work and resulted in appellant incurring considerable medical expense.
The neighbors commonly crossed over the trench
in going from the street to their homes along 18th Street,
both in the daytime and in the nighttime (Tr. 6).
The basis of the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
was that appellant was ·contributorily negligent as
1natter of law in attempting to cross the trench and enter
his residence from 18th Street.
STATEMENT OF POINT
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S CAUSE DEPRIVES HIM
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL. HE
WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS MATTER
OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S CAUSE DEPRIVES HIM
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL. HE
WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS MATTER
OF LAW.

This Court, in one of its 1nost recent caseR, has
clearly pronounced the rule which is applicable and which
is calculated to preserve for litigants their constitutional
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right of trial by jury. This Court stated t~lat only in
very clear cases should a trial judge direct a verdict
against plaintiff on the grounds that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Stickle r. Union Pacific Railroacl f'l a., ----~- Utah ______ , _____ _
P. 2d ------· Justice Crockett, in elucidating the right, further wrote:
··In our democratic syste1n, the people are the
repository of power whence the law is derived;
fr01n its initiation and ·creation to its final ~tpplica
tion and enforcen1ent, the law is the expression
of their \Yill. The functioning of a cross-section
of the citizenry as a jun~ is the Inethod by which
the people express this will in the application of
la-\v to controversies which arise under it. Both
our constitutional and statutory provisions assure
trial by jury to citizens of this state.
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous
powers by presuming to hold to them::;elves and
determine questions a.f fact which litigants have a
right to have passed upon by juries. Part of the
merit of the jury system is its safeguarding
against such arbitrary power in the courts. To
the great credit of the courts of this country,
they have been extremely reluctant to infringe upon this right, and by leaving it unimpaired have
kep:t the administration of justice close to the
people. Of course, the rights of litigants should
not be surrendered to the arbitrary will of juries
without regard to whether there is a violation of
legal rights as a basis for recovery. The court
does have a duty and a responsibility of supervisorY control over the action of juries which is
just ·as essential to the proper administration
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of justice as the jury itself. Nevertheless, we rernain cognizant of the vital ilnportance of the
privilege of trial by jury in our system of justice
and deP;rn it our duty to zealously protect and preserve it."
Reasonable men may differ as to the reasonableness of the course appellant pursued on the early morning of the 26th of June, 1951 in crossing 18th Street to
enter his home. Some such men may think that he should
have walked a block at that late hour of the night in order
to avoid the necessity of stepping across the trench. Some
such men we insist would have thought his course of conduct, under all the circumstances, reasonable and such as
they themselves might have taken. This disagreement
between reasonable persons makes the conduct of appellant a question of fact. The fact that it is close and that
reasonable men may differ in judgment of appellant's
conduct is one of the mos\t salient reasons why the jury
should consider and pass upon appellant's cause.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Bailey
v. Central Ve'fmont Ry., Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 63'S. Ct. 1062,
1064, discusses the right of trial by jury and the rights
of plaintiffs to have the jury apply to their conduct the
standard of reasonableness. Mr. Justice Douglas, in discussing the conduct of Bailey, made the following statement which seems especially pertinent in the present
case:
"The nature of the task which Bailey undertook, the hazards which it entailed, the effort
which it required, the kind of footing he had, th9
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space in which he could stand, the absence of a
guard rail, the height of the bridge above the
ground, the fact that the car could have been opened or unloaded near the bridge on level groundall these were facts and circumstances for the jury
to weigh and appraise in determining whether
respondent in furnishing Bailey with that particular place in which to perform the task was negligent. The debatable quality of that issue, the fact
that fair-minded men might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness of leaving
the question to the jury. The jury is the tribunal
under our legal system to decide that type of issue
(Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line H. Co., supra) as
well as issues involving controverted evidence.
Jones v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S.
443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L. Ed. 478; Washington
& G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 8. Ct.
1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235. To withdraw such a
question from the jury is to usurp its functions."
The application of the reasonable man standard is
the job which the jury must be allowed to perform. A
judicial application of the standard must ·of necessity
decide factual ques1tions. First, the judge must decide
the facts and circumstances confronting appellant. Second, he must apply to that factual situation factual standards and adjudge that the conduct of appellant was not
the conduct of a reasonable man. All of these functions
are the job of the jury.
We have presented by the facts of this appeal a
situation of appellant exposing himself to a known danger in order to exercise the right and privilege which
he has to use the highways and streets of Ogden City and
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to cross from said streets into his place of residence.
Under such circumstances the mere fact that there is an
exposure to danger and risk of bodily harm does not as
matter of law 1nake appellant guilty of contributory
negligence. It is only when the risk of bodily harm is
unreasonable or, to put it another way, when such risk
is greater than a reasonable man would take that appel
lant's conduct becomes negligent and bars him from recovering against the respondents. A.L.I. Restatement
of the Law of Torts, Vol. II, p. 1243, Sec. 473.
The factual situation involves a number of factual
considerations. For instance, a comparison between the
right 'to be exercised and the risk to be encountered is of
prin1ary ilnportance. Also to be considered is the inconvenience of alt.e·rnative methods of exercising the right
or privilege. It could be conceded that there is a point
when use of the streets and sidewalks will become so
dangerous that an individual entitled to use streets and
sidewalks should not use them but should seek an alternative route if one exists. If no alternative exists he
would still be entitled to use the· streets regardless of
the risk of injury.
There appears to be a sliding scale. The less convenient and more circuitous the alternative route becomes
the greater the dangers may be to which a reasonable
man would expose himself. The purpose for which appellant was using the highway, the time of day, alternative route, dangers involved, and convenience to appellant's wife accompanying him, are all factual matter.:;
surrounding the occurrence which mu:.;t be resolved to
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decide whether or not appellant's conduct \vas negligent.
Stating the proposition another way, whether or not appellant's action is reasonable always depends on whether
or not the advantage to be gained by using the street
in its dangerous condition is or is not sufficient to justify
the danger involved in its use. A.L.I. Restatement of the
Lmc of Torts, Yol. II, p. 12±3, Sec. 473.
A person whose access to a residence is obstructed
by negligent maintenance of a public street, is justified
in taking a greater risk to enter or leave his home than
a traveler would take merely to use the highway for an
ordinary purpose of travel. Only when the risk is so
great that injury is unavoidable would a reasonable man
forego the exercise of this right.
Whether or not conduct is contributory negligence
must depend upon the circumstances of each particular
case. The application of the reasonable man standard
it is submitted is the function assigned to the jury and
in the present case that function has been usurped by
the judge, and appellant has been deprived of his right
to a jury trial.
The jury must itself define the standard of a reasonable man and then apply that standard to the conduct of
the appellant. Both of these functions are factual in their
nature and the court by performing them deprives appellant of his constitutional right of trial by jury.
There can be no dispute about one particular applicable principle. Appellant had a right to use the public
streets and sidewalks from side to side and this right
would, of course, increase the amount of risk which he,
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as a reasonable man, could take in the exercise of his
right.
In Stringham et al. v. Salt Lake City, 114 Utah 517
201 P. 2d 758, 762, this Court, in establishing for the citizens of the State of Utah their right to use the publie
streets and sidewalks, stated as follows:
"However, in detennining this question it is
necessary to examine the fundamental ideas underlying the use of public streets. Streets from
side to side, including the sidewalks and all area
between are primarily for the public use. The
public use is paramount. As stated in McQuillan .
1\;funici pal Corporations, 2nd Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 981,
at page 217:

'' '* * * In the control of streets and
public ways the municipality is a trustee for
the entire public, and as such trustee it should
permit nothing Ito be done that will interfere
with the condition of the streets or their free
use by all alike * * *.'
"The interest of the public in the streets is characterized in the case of Thompson v. Smith, 155
Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 583, 71 A.L.R. 604, as follows:
"Use of streets for ordinary purposes of life
is a right. 'It is not a mere privilege, like the
privilege of moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or transporting
persons or ptoperty for hire along the street,
which a city may permit or prohibit at will.'
(Italics added.)
"Similar pronouncements may be found in:
:JlcGuire v. \Vilkerson, 22 Old. Cr. 36, 209 P. -l-!5;
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\Vood v. City of Chickasha, 125 Old. 212, 257 P.
:286; Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230, 21 A. 539, 12
L.R .•-\. 57; Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis,
131 Minn. 195, 154 N:\V. 964, L.R.A. 1916C, 224;
and many others."
.Applications of law to a number of fact situations
more or less similar to the present case have been discovered by appellant. These cases show a steadfast
protection of the right of trial by jury in cases similar to
the case at bar. One of the cases most similar in fact is
Alarid, et al. L'. Gordon, et al., 35 N.M. 502, 2 P. 2d 117.
There plaintiff, walking along a city street, feU into an
open lateral which had been excavated in the construction
of a sewer. The trial court found generally in favor of
the plaintiff, awarding her damages for the injuries which
she suffered. The defendant appealed, the basic grounds
being that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, stating that it appe·ared from
the undisputed evidence that the plaintiff entered upon
a dangerous place and atte·mpted to pass through and
over said dangerous place wi'th full knowledge of the
fact that public improvements were being made ; that she
might have chosen a safe route which would not have
taken her out of her w:ay more than a few minutes at
most, and elected to take th~ dangerous route instead of
the safe route and was guilty of contributory negligence
which was the primary cause of her accident. The court
rejects the proposition and states that after plaintiff had
chosen her route from her home she discovered the existence of the laterals; i:hat to turn back on her chosen
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route at that ti1ne would have been unnatural and there
was a question of fact whether or not an ordinary prudent person would have proceeded along the route after
discovery of the lateral construction. The court had no
trouble whatsoever in finding that the leaving of open
laterals unlighted, without a watchman or a barricade
was negligence on the part of the contractor.
A case very close on the facts wherein a bank on
which plaintiff was standing caved, precipitating her
into a hole, is Tait v. Kirng County, 85 Wash. 491, 148 Pac.
586,. 589. In discussing the question of whether or not
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, the court sets- out the pe-rtinent facts and
states as foHows:
"The next question is whether the appellant
was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter
of law. The evidence shows that she knew the condition of Beach Drive, and of the particular hole
into which she fell, for some months prior to the
accident; that she had frequently traveled over
the street; that she had a lantern at home, but
did not take it with her upon this particular occasion; that at the time of the accident she was advised by her daughter and knew they were closely
approaching the hole into which she fell. The evidence does not show, however, that she had an~·
knowledge that the subsoil or undersoil was washed away so as to leave the upper and hard surface
in the form of a projecting ledge. 'She did not step
into the hole, but, while standing near the edge
thereof, the ground upon which she was standing
gave way under her feet. The law does not in all
cases hold a person, injured by a defect in a highSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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way, g·uilty of contributory negligence merely because such person may have had previous knowledge of the defect, but generally treats the, matter
of knowledge as a fact or circumstance bearing upon the question of contributory negligence to be
subn1itted to the jury along with all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the accident, leaving it
for them to determine whether, under the facts
shown, the injured person was or was not guilty of
contributory negligence. Blankenship v. l{ing
County, 68 \Yash. 84, 122 Pac. 616, 40 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 182. But in this case, as already mentioned,
while the plaintiff had the knowledge of the hole,
it was not shown that she had knowledge of the
particular defect which caused the ground to
break off under her feet and precipitate her into
the washout. Had she stepped over into the hole
without the dirt giving way, a different question
would be presented. Under the facts as shown· by
the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude
that the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, but the question is one
for the jury.
"The judgment will he reversed, and the cause
remanded, with direction to the superior court to
grant a new trial."
Somewhat similar in principle is the case of City of
Guthrie v. Swan, 5 Okl. 779, 51 Pac. 562, 564. The plaintiff there had judgment. Defendant appealed and asserted that plaintiff's evidence showed her to be guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court,
in discussing this particular proposition, stated as follows
concerning the laws as applied to the facts wherein a person knows of a dangerous condition in a public street
and sidewalk :
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"The second proposition of the plaintiff in
error is that the testimony of the plaintiff show~
that she was guilty of contributory negligence, and
that the court should have sustained the demurrer
to the plaintiff's evidence. Testimony was adduced
to show that as the plaintiff approached First
street the sidewalk was torn up and piled in sections; that there were no red lights at the point
of injury on First street; that there was no railing
built there as a preventive against danger, and
that when she came to First street she saw that
it was graded; that it was dark, cloudy, 'particularly dark'; that she stepped down slowly and
carefully; thought she was stepping down a foot,
and that when she struck the ground it must haw'
·been two or three feet; that she did not obseJTf'
that the sidewalk had been torn up until she got
to the place where it was taken up; that she could
not see it before; that when she discovered it~
condition she went immediately into the road,
where she thought it was smooth, and walk~d
along there; that she traveled on the south side of
the sidewalk, on the street, in coming up to the
point where she was injured; that she knew the
street was not traveled on the north side as much
as on the south side; that the ground was higher
and sloped up higher on the north than on the
south side; and that when she !'ltep:ped down into
the dark place it was a great deai further than she
expected, and the injury followed; that she was
on her way home from a chureh meeting when
the injury complained of occurred; that she had
no knowledge that any cut had been made across
there at the time she started from the church to go
hmne, and that she had not bern along there after
the cut wa:s made. These circumstances, adduced
in evidence, were such as that it wa~ the duty of
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the court to subrnit them to the jury for determination as to whether or not, under proper instructions, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. The
same question was submitted for the consideration
of this court upon the fonner trial of this case,
and there passed upon, and similar conditions
have been uniformly submitted to the jury upon
the trial of like cases in the territory with the
approval of this court. The sufficiency of the highway is ahnost always a rnere question of fact to be
detern1ined by the jury upon the evidence of its
actual condition. Draper v. Town of Ironton, 42
Wis. 696.
'"And, in the third place, the plaintiff in error
objects espeeially to the eighth instruction given
to the jury by the court as a misdirection of the
law applied to the facts in this case. The instruction directed the jury that the plaintiff had a
right to presume that the sidewalk was reasonably
safe, but if, in passing upon it, she saw that there
was an appearance of danger,~ then she had no
right to proceed further upon the presumption
that the walk was in a safe condition, but that the
law required her, after she had noticed the danger, to use care commtnsurate with such apparent
danger, and, if she failed to so act, and received
the injury, she could not .recover; but that if, after
she received the notice of the danger, she wa:;
then in the exercise of due care, and under the
belief that she had found a safe place to travel,
she attempted to pass along the street, and in
such attempt received an injury, which could not
have been avoided by the use of a degree of care
apparently sufficient to avoid the danger, then
she might reco;ver for the injuries sustained, if
caused by the negligence of the city. The jury
could not have bet-n misled by this instruction,
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
for the la~v, which requires that the plaintiff
rnust have been in the exercise of due care, and
that care should be used commensurate with the
apparent danger in order to enable the plaintiff
to avoid the danger, and that if she was not in
the exermse of such degree of care she could not
recover, was such as has been approved in thi~
court in similar ~ases, and we believe to be correct."
See also City of Guthrie v. Swan, 3 Old. 116, 41 Pac.
84 for an earlier appeal of 1he same case. See also Shandraw et ux. v. City of Tacom '"t, 188 Wash. 389, 62 P. 2d
1090.
An early Nebraska case which appellant submits
establishes the la:w as applicable to appellant's ca:se i::.
Village of Ponca v. Crawford, 23 Nebr. 662, 37 N.W. 609,
610, 8 Am. St. Rep. 144. Plaintiff there was walking along
the village streets, camP to a break in the sidewalk which
necessitated him lowering himself down approximately
three feet. He was attempting to traverse t.he break when
he fell over a sawhorse and suffered the injuries necessitating the legal action. The village claimed that plaintiff
was contributorily negligent a'S a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Nebraska in disposing of this contention
stated as follows:

"* * * Whether a person of ordinary care and
prudence, of the knowledge of, and acquaintanc~·
with, the streets and sidewalks of a village,- or
the want of either-which the plaintiff was shmrr.
to have possessed, would have turned hack anJ
abandoned his purpose in proceeding along the
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street, on ascertaining that there was an apparent
break in the sidewalk, or would have continued
his endeavor to proceed, i~ a question of fact for
the jury, proper for their consideration and determination under instructions."
As appears from the quoted language, the Nebraska
Court had exactly the situation now presented to our
Utah Court, and appellant submits that the principles
applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court should be applied by this Court.
~\. later Nebraska case set forth the principle that
the municipal corporation has a duty to keep the streets
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel
by the public; that there is no duty on the part of a
citizen to abandon the use of the streets when he discovers that they are in an unsafe condition. The only
effect such a discovery has is to place upon such a citizen
the duty of exercising extra caution in crossing over or
using the public sidewalks and streets. Pilnches v. Village
of Dickens) 127 Nebr. 239, 254 N.W. 877.
The Mis·souri Court of Appeals applied what has
become the principles adopted by the A.L.I. Restatement
of the Law of Torts in the case of Francis v. City of West

Plains} 203 Mo. App. 249, 216 S.W. 808. There, as in the
present case, a person in the darkness while attempting
to use a highway under construction, had fallen into a
hole and suffered a very severe injury. The Missouri
Court of Appeals stated the principles applicable in the
following language :
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"* * * A person has a right to use a sidewalk
which he knows is dangerous if he in such knowledge uses it with care to himself. It is not conributory negligence as a n1atter of law, unless
the defect is so glaringly dangerous that no prudent person would attempt to pass over it. Loftes
v. Kansas City, 156 M.:o. App. 683, 137 S.W. 993;
Graney v. City of St. Louis, 141 Mo. 180, 42 S.\Y.
941."
In the Francis case the Supreme Court of Missouri
held that the question of whether or not the injured
plaintiff's conduct was :r;>roper was a question for the jury.
A large number of cases have applied principles
that are set forth in the Restatement. Among such cases
are City of Bloomington v. Rogers, 9 Ind. App. 230, 36
N.E. 439, 13 Ind. App. 121, 41 N.E. 395; Blessington v.
City of Boston, 153 Mass. 409, 26 N.E. 1113; City of Su..perior v. Olt, 239 Fed. 100.
Appellant submits that the application of the reasonable man's standard to appellant's conduct is required
if appellant is accorded his cons'titutional rights. Rele. .
vant to the jury's consideration are the following facts:
( 1) The trench was relatively narrow and
easily stepped across and straddled by appellant.
'(2) Appellant was accompanied by his wifP
and there was no way of entering his home from
the street except by walking either to Washington
Avenue or back down to Grant Avenue.
(3) The appearance of the asphalt surface
of the highway around the trench bearing on
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whether or not it could safely bear weight and
provide an adequate footing.
( 4) The fact that appellant had chosen his
way of getting hon1e prior to the time that he became fully aware of the nature of the trench which
barred access to his home. As is stated in one of
the cited cases, it w·ould be unnatural for him to
abandon his chosen route unless confronted with
an extren1e hazard which made injury very likely.
{5) The jury could also consider the fact
that the neighbors habitually crossed back and
forth over the trench, both in the daytime. and at
night, and that they apparently were of the op~n
ion that it could be safely stepped acro'ss to gain
access to their homes.
(6) The convenience of merely stepping
across a two foot trench as compared to walking
a full block late at night in order to gain access
to one's home.
Each one of the considerations set forth in the preceding paragraphs necessitate a careful weighing of
facts and the choosing of alternative courses of conduct.
By the very nature of the problem the court usurped the
function of the jury in solving these problems and dismissing appellant's cause.
The appellant successfully stepped across the trench
and it is only when an unexpected and undiscoverabl~
event occurs that any injury re'Sults to him, that event
being the caving of the bank under appellant's foot causing his fall into the trench.
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The duty upon the respondents to provide a reasonably safe means of crO'ssing from the street onto the sidewalk, especially at the point where the sidewalk on Kiesel
Avenue crosses 18th Street would seem to be beyond
any drspute. Had a bridge or walkway been provided by
respondents, properly lighted, appellant would not have
been required to expose himself to the danger of crossing
an open trench and the injuries which he received would
not have been incurred.
There is nothing about appellant's conduct which
would be extraordinary or would indicate a la:ck of care
for hi's oiWil safety. The jury could well have found on
the basis of appellant's opening statement that appellant
was exercising care for his own safety. There is no evidence from which they would be impelled to find that
he was guilty of negligence. Appellant respectfully
submits that the trial court e·rred in concluding that appellant was contributorily negligent as matter of law
and dismissing his cause with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respe·ctfully submits that this Court should
reverse the order and judgment of the· trial court, granting appellant a new trial on the merits of his cause and
preserving to him his constitutional right of trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
DWIGHT L. KING,
Counsel for Plaintiff and
Appellant
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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